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RECENT DECISIONS

Belief in Supreme Being as
Requirement for Jury Service
Declared Unconstitutional
The appellant, a Buddhist convicted
of murder, alleged that the Maryland
constitutional provision' requiring a belief
in the existence of God as a qualification
for jury service was unconstitutional. He
asserted that, since Buddhists do not believe in God, they were excluded from the
1 MARYLAND CONST. art. 36. This article provides inter alia: "[N]or shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a
witness, or juror, on account of his religious
belief; provided, he believes in the existence
of God, and that under His dispensation such
person will be held morally accountable for
his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor
either in this world or in the world to come."
This article was construed to mean that one is
not competent as a juror if he does not believe
in the existence of God. State v. Mercer, 101
Md. 535, 61 Atl. 220 (1905). Prior to the
instant case there apparently were no Maryland cases challenging the constitutional validity
of this provision.

jury which convicted him, thereby depriving him of his constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection of
the law. The Maryland Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction, holding the requirement that a juror express a belief in
God as a qualification for jury service is
unconstitutional. Schowgurow v. State,
240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
Each state may prescribe the qualifications required for jury service, as provided in its statutes and constitutional
provisions. 2 However, this power of determining standards is not absolute, because a state is prohibited from discriminating in the selection of jurors. 3
Perhaps the most extensively litigated
area of discrimination in jury service has

E.g., Duggar v. State, 43 So. 2d 860 (Fla.
1949); People v. Mol, 137 Mich. 692, 100
N.W. 913 (1904).
3American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179
U.S. 89, 92 (1900).
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been that directed at Negroes. 4 The issue
was first directly dealt with by the United
States Supreme Court in Strauder v. West
Virginia.5 A state statute providing that
no Negro was eligible for jury service was
challenged by a Negro defendant. It was
held discriminatory, in violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment, since it excluded any member of the defendant's
race from the jury which tried him.' Similarly, convictions were reversed, although
the statutes were non-discriminatory, when
the methods actually used in selecting
jurors resulted in the systematic exclusion
of members of the defendant's race.7 In
addition to those cases where members of
defendant's own race had been excluded
from the jury, a defendant may challenge
the exclusion of any race from jury service. For example, an interesting situation
developed in Georgia when a Caucasian
claimed that his constitutional rights were
denied because Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service.8 The
court upheld this contention, noting that
the exclusion of any group denies the
defendant "the type of jury to which the
'0
law entitles him.
Discrimination against a certain class of
4E.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584
(1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Hale v.
Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
5 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Strauder v. West Virginia, supra note 4, at
310.
7Cassell v. Texas, supra note 4; Hill v. Texas,
supra note 4; Hale v. Kentucky, supra note 4.
8 Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d

711 (1964).
9ld. at 62, 137 S.E.2d at 715.

persons in the community was held un10
constitutional in Hernandez v. Texas.
The test utilized by the Court required
that the complainant establish that there
was a distinct class of persons in the community, and that this class had been systematically excluded in the selection of
the juries." This does not mean, however,
that every jury must contain representatives of all groups-economic, social, religious, racial-in the community, since
such complete representation would be
impossible. It does preclude systematic
and intentional exclusion of such groups
2
in jury selections.1
While the Supreme Court of the United
States has not ruled on the constitutionality of a religious test for the selection
of jurors, it has invalidated such a test as
a prerequisite for public office. In Torcaso
v. Watkins,"8 Article 37 of the Maryland
Constitution, requiring that a public officer
affirm his belief in the existence of God
as a prerequisite to taking office, was
struck down as unconstitutional."4 The
Court stated:
neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person
'to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass

10347 U.S. 475 (1954).

the class

Mexicans constituted

allegedly discriminated

against

in

Hernandez.

I' Id. at 480.
12Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946).
13 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
14 In striking down this provision, the Court

noted that among the religions in this country
which do not teach what would be considered
a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Human-

ism. Id. at 495 n.l.
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laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers . . . .5
Therefore, the Maryland religious test for
public office unconstitutionally invaded the
appellant's freedom of religion and could
not be enforced against him.
In holding that portion of Article 36
of the Maryland Constitution1 6 which prescribed a religious test for jury service
unconstitutional, the Court in the principal
case discussed those cases in which the
United States Supreme Court had held
that a defendant is denied equal protection
of the laws if he is tried by a jury from
which members of his race have been
systematically excluded. The Court indicated that there was no valid distinction
between racial discrimination and discrimination on the basis of religious belief or
the lack thereof.- 7 In addition, it was
indicated that in view of the Torcaso decision, the requirement as to a belief in
God for grand and petit jurors would also
be invalid. 8 As a result of the strong
presumption that public officers properly
perform their functions, it was reasoned
that because of article 36, judges made a
belief in God a condition to service as a
Ifd. at 495. See School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240
(1963) (concurring opinion).
16It should be noted that the Maryland provision as to jurors was unique among the
state constitutions. In fact, ten states specifically provide in their constitutions that a belief
in God is not a prerequisite to jury service.
ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 4; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 5; N.D. CONST. art. 1,
§ 4; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 6; TENN. CONST. art.
I, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 3; WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 11; Wyo.
CONST. art. I, § 18.

Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,
213 A.2d 475, 480 (1965).
18 Id.at - , 213 A.2d at 479.
17
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juror.19 The Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the fact that it was the
practice in the state not only to question
jurors as to their belief in God, but also
to so question prospective jurors before
placing them on the jury lists."2
On the other hand, the dissenting judge
argued that the requisite proof of discrimination had not been presented. The
dissent noted that the record was devoid
of proof that residents otherwise qualified
had been excluded because they were
non-believers. 1
The majority indicated that prior cases
which required proof of discrimination did
not involve statutes which were discriminatory on their face. Where discrimination results from practice rather than from
statutory mandate, the courts have placed
the burden of proof on the one questioning
such procedures. 2 But, where the exclusion is dictated by statute or constitutional
provision, there is prima facie discrimination. The state would have to overcome
this by clear proof of non-exclusion to
satisfy the court, and here no such proof
23

was proffered.

The Court held that the principle enunciated in the case should not be applied
retroactively, except in those cases where
conviction had not been finalized.2 4 Sev1:, Ibid.

Ibid.
Id. at
, 213 A.2d at 485-86.
22 Id. at-,
213 A.2d at 481.
23 Id. at
, 213 A.2d at 482.
- Ibid. There are presently two habeas corpus
proceedings before the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland questioning
the validity of the Court of Appeals' rejection
of retroactive application in Schowgurow. We
were informed of these cases by Morton A.
Sacks, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
in a letter of Nov. 19, 1965.
20
21
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eral reasons were given for so ruling:
(1) to avoid deciding whether only a
member of an excluded class could raise
the constitutional question; and, (2) if so,
to avoid the question as to which convicted defendants were non-believers at
the time of trial."5 The Court justified its
position of merely prospective application
by weighing the protection of individual
rights against the good of society, and
concluded that the social good outweighed
the individual rights involved.
As soon as the decision was rendered,
all criminal and some civil trials in Maryland were stayed. Grand and petit juries
were dismissed, and jury commissioners
sent out new questionnaires on which the
inquiry concerning the belief in God was
deleted.26 No juries will be available until
these forms are processed. How much
time this will take is, as yet, undetermined,
but it has been estimated that it will require two years to complete all the extra
clerical and trial work that has been
created.

27

One question presented by the decision
in the instant case was whether the right
to re-indictment could be effectively
waived. A subsequent decision of the
court of appeals has answered the question in the affirmative. In Smith v. State, '
a unanimous court rejected the defend2.- Subsequent to its decision in Schowgurow,
the Maryland Court of Appeals decided in
State v. Madison,
Md. , 213 A.2d
880 (1965), that a believer as well as a nonbeliever may avail himself of the right to
object to the use of article 36 in the selection
of his jury.
26 N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 24, 1965, p. 34,
col. 1.
27 Ibid.
28 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1965, p. 27, col. 3.

ant's contention that since the procedure
for determining grand jury members was
unconstitutional, it was not the proper
subject of an affirmative waiver. It would
appear, therefore, that the state will proceed with the trials of those defendants
who waived the re-indictment.
A second question raised by Schowgurow was answered in Hays v. State,2
which affirmed the right of a defendant
to raise the issue of the constitutionality
of the jury for the first time on appeal.
As a result of this decision, it appears
that those defendants whose cases are on
appeal or within the period allowed for
appeal or certiorari will have to be reindicted and retried.
The decision in the instant case raises
the possibility that that portion of Article
36 of the Maryland Constitution which
requires that a witness express a belief in
God will also be held unconstitutional. It
should be noted that in practice the witness in Maryland is given the choice of
taking an oath which is based on a belief
in God, or an affirmation simply attesting
to the truth of his testimony.
In view of these alternative means of
qualifying a witness, it would appear that
the practice is at variance with the state's
constitutional requirement. It remains to
be seen whether the courts will sanction
the practice and hold that the requirement
of article 36 in regard to witnesses is
unconstitutional.
Since the instant case was decided on
the basis of a previous Supreme Court decision, it is unlikely that the constitutional
question will be appealed. This is perhaps
unfortunate, for, if given the opportunity,
29

Ibid.

12
the Court, in affirming, might very well
expand on its decision in Torcaso, and
might outlaw religious tests not only for
public officials but also for jurors and
witnesses. Such a decision, establishing a
national standard, would prevent state decisions from remaining as controlling
authority.

Claim of Relational Right of
Privacy Denied
The widow and son of Alphonse (Al)
Capone and the administratrix of his
estate brought an action against the producers, the sponsor and the broadcasting
company which telecast several programs
purportedly based on the life of the deceased. The estate claimed a property
right in the name, likeness and personality
of Capone, while the wife and son asserted
an invasion of their right of privacy, even
though they were not mentioned in the
telecast. In affirming the decision of the
district court, the United States Court of
Appeals held that the estate had no protectible property right in the name, and,
that under Illinois law, living relatives of
a decedent are not entitled to recover
under a "relational right" of privacy.
Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d
418 (7th Cir. 1965).
Although the right of privacy is now
recognized and protected,' it has been held

1 See

generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right

of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); The
Right of Privacy, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 335 (1965).
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The fact that the Maryland provision
remained in effect for so long is indicative
of how religious beliefs are used to judge
a man's qualifications for public service.
The courts should be quick to assert that
religion is not an acceptable standard by
which the state should judge a man's
capacity.

2
that a deceased person has no such right.
However, there is some conflict 3 as to
whether there exists a "relational right"
of privacy, i.e., a right of the living relatives of the decedent to be protected from
unwarranted publications or disclosures
concerning the deceased person's life. The
prevailing opinion is that the right of
privacy is personal, not relational, and
4
that it does not survive the decedent.
This conclusion follows from the failure
of the courts to recognize a right of privacy
when the party claiming the right is not
mentioned in the course of the alleged
invasion, 5 and from the historical policy
against survival of defamation actions.6

300 F.2d 854, 857 (7th
Cir. 1962); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434,
447, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (1895).
Compare Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. Rep.
2d 315, 322-23, 239 P.2d 876, 881 (1952),
with Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So.
2d 118, 121 (1948).
4 E.g., Coversone v. Davies, 38 Cal. Rep. 2d
315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952); Bradley v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168
N.E.2d 64 (1960).
5Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., supra
note 4.
6 See Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L.
REV. 237, 247-48 (1932).
2 Ravellette v. Smith,

